21.6 Michael Harrington, from *Socialism: Past and Future*

In the excerpt from *Socialism: Past and Future* included below, the historian Michael Harrington outlines the history of socialism, stressing the diversity of opinions and ideas contained within the socialist tradition. In particular, he examines the development and spread of utopian socialist visions.

Source: *Socialism: Past and Future,* by Michael Harrington (East Haven, CT: Inland Book Co., 1993), pp. 28–37.

People speak of socialism. We should speak of socialisms.

There is an amnesia about the socialist tradition that abandons entire definitions of that ideal made by serious mass movements. There are dictionary definitions—socialism is the public ownership of the means of production and distribution—which are faded abstractions of one fragment of a rich conceptual heritage. There are Marxist statements, often Delphic in their vagueness but always suffused with a sense of history, which are turned into transhistorical truths and chiseled into stone. And there are simplistic assumptions that the antisocialist practice of states calling themselves socialist describes something called "really-existing" socialism.

What is needed, if socialism is to find a new relevance for the twenty-first century, is some sense of its enormous diversity and complexity. This chapter and the next will survey socialisms, the various and conflicting ways that the movement tried to give specific meaning to its profound and imprecise demand for democratic socializing. This history is far from linear: it opens with the recent rediscovery of the earliest "utopian "socialist tradition and its relevance to the future. And it attempts to learn from the terrible socialisms—the antisocialist "socialisms"—as well.

All of this is not an act of piety toward the past and certainly not an attempt to write, even in outline, a survey of socialist thought. It is thematic, focusing on a few particularly revealing moments. It frankly and knowingly concentrates on that part of the past that might be usable—as either a good or a horrible example—in building the future. That is fully apparent in the very first socialism to be discussed, that of the "utopians."

It was no accident that utopian socialism was rediscovered in the 1960s and had a significant impact on important political movements in the West a century and a half after it began. Suddenly, ideas that had been given an elegant, somewhat respectful burial by Marx and Engels seemed to speak to significant numbers of the post-World War II generation in the advanced capitalist countries. Utopian socialism also took on a new incarnation in "African" socialism. And it pointed toward a new history of the nineteenth-century past in which the long-forgotten struggles of artisans suddenly came to life because scholars now lived in the age of the computer.

I

It is, Martin Buber wrote, "the goal of Utopian socialism . . . to substitute society for State to the greatest degree possible, moreover a society that is 'genuine' and not a State in disguise. "That is as good a definition as you will find—even though it is more complex than it might at first seem. For though utopia exalted society as against the state, it led to technocracy as well as anarchism, to Stalinism as well as the Israeli *kibbutz.* And it may well be relevant to the twenty-first century in ways that its nineteenth-century progenitors, for all of their talent for the imaginary and even the fantastic, would never have imagined.

This early socialism was concerned with morality, community, and feminism. None of its founders—Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen—was a democrat, but the movements they inspired were profoundly democratic. Saint-Simon tried to win both Napoleon and Louis XVIII to his ideas, and some of his followers reached out to Metternich; Fourier waited for some wealthy philanthropist to make his proposals possible; and Robert Owen tried to convince both the lords and bishops of his native Britain and the Congress of the United States. So one has to look, not simply at the ideas that the utopian thinkers put down on paper, but at the shrewd readings made of them by people without much formal education.

In most histories, the first modern socialist is Gracchus Babeuf, the leader of the Conspiracy of Equals during the French Revolution, a man who tried to carry Jacobinism to its ultimate and radical conclusion. In contrast, these utopians tended to be anti-Jacobin, decentralist and social rather than centralist and political, and two of them, Fourier and Saint-Simon, had unhappy personal experiences with the upheaval in France. They wrote as the industrial revolution was taking off. Owen was a factory owner, and Saint-Simon might be said to have been the first philosopher of industrialism and, for that matter, the first "historical materialist," with his emphasis on the underlying importance of the economic in social and political history. Both of them greeted the new technological world as a means to their utopian ends. Fourier is the exception, the one of the three who was not that enthusiastic about industrial progress. Yet he was far ahead of his time as a thinker who made an almost Freudian definition of what socialism would be.

These are all familiar facts. But there are ambivalences and ambiguities concealed within them that are not so obvious and yet had a profound impact upon subsequent history. Above all, there was a strange mix of the technocratic and the decentralist in Saint-Simon and in some ways in Robert Owen. It was a major source of that dangerous imprecision in Karl Marx and most of the socialists of the twentieth century about the meaning of socialization.

Saint-Simon was a champion of industrial progress and saw the concentration of industry and, above all, of finance as a precondition of his most radical hopes. At the same time, he was caught up in e Romantic fascination with the organic as opposed to the artificial and saw the high point of medieval society—with its ordered, functional hierarchies—as one of the great positive accomplishments of humanity. That attitude was, of course, a staple of the reactionaries and conservatives, of Maistre, Bonald and Edmund Burke, and all the others who fulminated against those who would try to plan the future on the basis of some kind of a rational model. Yet Saint-Simon, who was explicitly influenced by the French variant of that conservative school, was one of the first to formulate the concept of economic planning.

This celebrant of industrial centralization was also the first major theorist to proclaim the "withering away of the state." In the past, Saint-Simon argued, government had been imposed upon society from the top down; it was not organic. But now society was becoming industrial, the economic and the technological were the critical determinants of everything else, and there would be no need of politics. The functional organization of production was all the leadership and direction that was needed. To be sure, there had to be leaders—Saint-Simon, like the other utopians, was appalled by the ugly competitive anarchy of *laisser-faire*—but now they would be defined organically, by their role in the economy, and not by an extraneous state.

In his initial version of this theory, the leaders were to be the wise men, the scholars and engineers. Later, Saint-Simon saw them as the captains of industry—*les industrials*—and counterposed them, and everyone else who worked, to the parasitic bourgeois who simply lived off of capital. Ultimately, Saint-Simon and his followers looked to bankers to take a pride of place among the *industriels*, seeing them as planners who, by their rational criteria for investment, overcame the wasteful competition sponsored by the lazy bourgeoisie. As a result, this utopian socialist was recognized as a mentor by some of the most successful financiers in France.

But how can one man inspire both the banking industry and the socialist movement? In a profound sense, Saint-Simon himself did not effect that paradox. He remained true to the obvious technocratic implications of his analysis—although in 1819 he did propose in his *Parabole* that it was possible to dispense with the entire ecclesiastical and bureaucratic apparatus of the French state, a suggestion that got him into trouble with his more conservative supporters. It was the Saint-Simonians who squared the circle. If government was now to be replaced by society as defined functionally, then the critical question became: What is society and who are its functional leaders? For Saint-Simon, the answer was industrialists and bankers—but bankers and industrialists who were viewed as workers in contrast to the coupon-clipping bourgeois. Saint-Simon died in 1825 under the Restoration, and that was his mature view.

But the men and women who elaborated *The Doctrine of Saint-Simon*, in an enormously influential book of that name, lived and worked immediately before and after the Revolution of 1830 and, in the name of an orthodox "exposition" of the master's thoughts, radically changed it. The state, they said, would turn into "the *ASSOCIATION OF WORKERS*." Saint-Simon could have agreed with the verbal formula, since he thought of a banker as a worker—but that was not what the new interpretation had in mind. It referred to the new class of proletarians. Moreover, a striking word had come into play, one that echoes throughout the history of French socialism: *association*. Saint-Simon himself had never used it, and, as read by workers and revolutionaries, it came to mean that *socialism was a society controlled from the bottom up by associations of workers*. That notion was to be key to the syndicalist socialism of Proudhon and to the utopianism of the arch anti-utopian, Karl Marx.

At the same time, the Saint-Simonians defined both the class struggle and the concept of exploitation. Chapter 6 of *The Doctrine* was headed, "The successive transformation of the exploitation of man by man and of the right of property: Master-Slave—Patrician-Plebian—Lord-Serf Parasite-Worker." That formulation anticipates, but is transformed in, the first line of *The Communist Manifesto*. The chapter went on to show that a "fair" contract between a rich parasite and a poor worker was inherently unfair and brought wealth to the former and poverty to the latter. And that, of course, is a central theme of *Das Kapital*.

These ideas did not remain the property of a small sect of true believers. Particularly after the disillusionment with the Revolution of 1830, Saint-Simonianism became a major movement in France, in large part because one of the central themes of the utopian socialists was feminism. Indeed, it can be argued that the cultural and social radicalism of the Saint-Simonian movement was decisive in transforming a technocratic theory into a socialist and democratic vision.

All three of the great utopians placed a major emphasis upon the role of women. "The change in an historical epoch," Fourier had written, "can always be determined by the progress of woman toward freedom, because in the relation of women to man, of the weak to the strong, the victory of human nature over brutality is most evident. The greed of feminine emancipation is the natural measure of general emancipation." Indeed, Fourier's basic definition of community was that it would put an end to instinctual repression, allow the human passions to become the mainspring of social life, and lead to erotic, as well as economic, liberation.

"Too many restraints have been imposed on the passion of love," Fourier wrote. "This is proved by the fact that no man wishes to obey the legal injunction to practice continence outside of marriage. The infractions of men have inspired those of women, and love in civilized society is nothing but universal anarchy and secret insurrection." People with exotic sexual tastes would, so long as their activity was consensual and did not do bodily harm, "meet regularly at international convocations which would be pilgrimages as sacred to them 'as the journey to Mecca for Muslims.' "

Some of the Owenites had a similar view. "If you love one another," one of them told the young people, "go together at any time without any law or ceremony." One of the reasons for this attitude was a feeling that the bourgeoisie bought and sold wives and even encouraged prostitution. Sex, these utopian movements said, had to be freed in every way from commercialization. In the case of the Saint-Simonians, feminism was probably a decisive factor in turning the movement toward the Left and democracy. That is how the Saint-Simonian *movement*, which was Romantic where the master was technological, became a significant force in France in the 1830s, with a nationwide network of "temples of humanity" and some 40,000 adherents and intellectual sympathizers, including George Sand, Heinrich Heine, Goethe (the ending of *Faust* is Saint-Simonian), and Franz Liszt. Flora Tristan, a fascinating and influential woman from an extraordinary family—her brother became president of Peru, her grandson was the painter Paul Gauguin—combined two of the central Saint-Simonian themes: she saw the "equality of rights between men and women as the sole means of establishing Human Unity"; and she believed that the democratic organization of the working people would become a self-governing estate of the realm.

As George Lichtheim summarized the Saint-Simonians:

> Here, all of a sudden, there was a new vision of man no longer dull and rationalistic, but sentimental and passionate. The synthesis operated at every level: intellectual, moral, political, metaphysical. Socialism was a *faith*—that was the great discovery the Saint-Simonians had made! It was the "new Christianity, "and it would emancipate those whom the old religion had left in chains—above all woman and the proletariat!

Owen's ideas went through a similar metamorphosis, with the difference that the master himself participated in both the conservative and radical interpretations of his thought. In the first phase, which lasted from the turn of the century into the 1820s, Owen was an imaginative industrialist who discovered that acting decently toward his workers changed their moral conduct and increased productivity at the same time. He then tried to convince the British and American elite that social justice was a pragmatic investment. During the very hard times after the Napoleonic Wars, there were widespread misery, unemployment, and, as a result, fear of revolution. The cost of caring for the poor—outlays that had been undertaken in considerable measure as an insurance policy against a French-style revolution in Britain—rose even as the wartime prosperity ended.

As E. P. Thompson put it, "The poor were unsightly, a source of guilt, a heave charge on the country, and a danger." In this setting, Owen proposed that the poor be put into "Villages of Cooperation" where, after initial public funding, they would pay their own way and engage in useful work that would make them disciplined and temperate. Cobbett wrote of the scheme: "Mr. Owen's object appears to me to be to cover the face of the country with workhouses, to rear up a community of slaves, and consequently to render the labouring part of the People absolutely dependent upon men of property." The Fourierists, with their Romantic values, were suspicious of Owen all along; but some of the Saint-Simonians, with their scientific emphasis, were attracted by his hardheadedness.

But then a number of things happened, and not only Owenism but Owen himself moved from humane elitism to a kind of working-class radicalism. one factor was that Owen's atheism became widely known and he was effectively shut out of polite society. Even more important, the Anti-Combination acts, which had been passed in 1799 and 1800 at the height of anti-Jacobin sentiment and which had done so much to frustrate organizing among the workers, were repealed in 1824–25. Trade-union and cooperative activity began to grow, and when Owen returned from his trip to the United States in 1829, he found himself in contact with a mass movement of unionists and cooperators. The sophisticated elitist became a tribune of the people.

Owenism was thus transformed from a philanthropic, top-down scheme for evading the class struggle through cooperation into a bottom-up insurgency of working people who were determined to rely on their own strength. At the same time, the cultural radicalism that had inspired Owen to denounce all religions as "a mass of iniquitous error" now asserted itself in his attack on marriage as "a Satanic device of the Priesthood to place and keep mankind within their slavish superstitions." In the new world, he said, "there will be no marriages of the priest or giving in marriage." This trend was reinforced, Barbara Taylor documents, when the Saint-Simonians came to propagandize the English in 1832 and advocated "moral marriage," that is, free unions based on affection and without the sanction of official ceremony. The French and British socialists, one hostile observer said, address themselves "to the weaker sex, upon whom they hope to make a fatal impression, as the serpent succeeded with Eve."

As Owenism developed in this fashion, it also converged with some of Fourier's communitarian ideas. Fourier was not simply an isolated—and sometimes half-mad—proponent of fascinating utopias, although he was certainly that. He answered the standard conservative challenge, Who will do the dirty work?, with the proposition that "small hordes" of

children, who love to play in the mud, would exercise that function. More seriously, he looked to the transformation of the very nature of work: in his commune (the *phalanstere*), there would be two thousand people, none of whom would work more than two hours at the same job, all of whom would freely choose the task they liked best and become masters of it.

These utopian ideas—if not the "anti-lion," a gentle version of that animal capable of lying down with lambs, that he imagined would come to exist in the utopian era—had a significant impact upon the Saint-Simonians, particularly when they talked of "associations" as the key to the future, reached out to the Transcendentalists at Brook Farm in the United States, and found echoes in the cooperative movement in Britain. There was a reason why such notions found a surprising resonance among ordinary people, and it is most visible in E. P. Thompson's description of the Owenites.

A good number of them were artisans. They could become cooperators in part because they had confidence in their own skill and the value of their work. They, like most of the early socialists, believed in some variant of the labor theory of value—that honest work is the source of wealth, and therefore it is the honest worker who should be the recipient of that wealth. This view coincided with their own personal experience. And they were often political radicals who believed in a "republican "ideology in which no citizen should even have to bow down to any other citizen. America, which seethed with utopian experiments during the nineteenth century, had the same tendencies. We know that the Left—republican—wing of the revolution in this country was, more often than not, supported by artisans.

So were the radical and trade-union movements of the early nineteenth century. The first labor parties in world history were formed in 1828 and 1829 in Philadelphia and New York, and the feminist and interracialist, Frances Wright, found appreciative artisan, audiences in the process. This was a stratum hungry for ideas, which met to discuss books, and which often reinterpreted the programs of their "betters"—as they did so dramatically in the case of Owen and Saint-Simon. They were joined by outcasts from the unskilled and deracinated poor, and by middle-class reformers.

The utopians failed. In Europe, their high-water mark was the 1830s, and they were not really an organized force by the time of the upheavals of 1848. But this is not quite precise. There was a second definition of socialism that came very much to the fore in Paris in 1848, and it is associated with the name of Louis Blanc. Socialism, this tendency said in an anticipation of the Keynesian social democracy of the 1960s, is *full employment, the right of every worker to a job.* Blanc, who had a brief moment of power in the February revolution, wanted to fulfill that promise by national work shops. But—and here this progenitor of an early democratic socialism acknowledged a debt to the utopians in general and Fourier in particular—the workers were to elect the directors and were to become part of local communes sharing housing and social services.

Moreover, the struggle of artisans throughout the nineteenth century against a centralized, machine-run technology, which changed the nature of work and robbed them of the value of their acquired skills, was clearly connected to the utopian insistence on the creativity and dignity of work. In the United States, the historian David Montgomery has described a long war of attrition between those skilled workers and management about who would control the workplace itself. In that down-to-earth history, one hears the ongoing relevance of Fourier and Owen.

Utopian socialism, then, was not the preserve of scholars in their studies. It was a movement that gave the first serious definition of socialism as communitarian, moral, feminist, committed to the transformation of work. That tradition came to be regarded as an immature first step, a prelude, rather than as something of enduring value. If there is to be a twenty-first-century socialism worthy of the name, it will, among other things, have to go two hundred years into the past to recover the practical and theoretical ideals of the utopians.

Question:

1. What are the virtues and shortcomings of utopian socialism?

21.7 Anarchism: Michael Bakunin

The anarchist revolutionary Michael Bakunin (1814–1876) was born into an aristocratic Russian family. Despite his background, he became active in revolutionary politics and was eventually exiled to Siberia. After escaping Siberia in 1861, he traveled to Britain where he became an influential figure in socialist politics. His belief in radical individualism brought him into conflict with Karl Marx. In the document included here, Bakunin outlined his social and political principles.

Source: *Principles and Organization of the International Brotherhood,* by Michael Bakunin in *Michael Bakunin Selected Writings,* ed. Arthur Lehning, (Grove Press, Inc., 1974), pp. 64–69, 76–78, 82–85, 87, 90–92, passim.

I. AIM OF THE SOCIETY

1. The aim of this society is the triumph of the principle of revolution in the world, and consequently the radical overthrow of all presently existing religious, political, economic and social organizations and institutions and the reconstitution first of European and subsequently of world society on the basis of *liberty, reason, justice* and *work.*

2. This kind of task cannot be achieved overnight. The association is therefore constituted for an indefinite period, and will cease to exist only on the day when the triumph of its principle throughout the world removes its *raison de être.*[1]

II. REVOLUTIONARY CATECHISM

1. Denial of the existence of a real, extra-terrestrial, individual God, and consequently also of any revelation and any divine intervention in the affairs of the human world. *Abolition of the service and worship of divinity.*

2. In replacing the worship of God by *respect* and *love for humanity,* we assert *human reason* as the one criterion of truth; *human conscience* as the basis of justice; *individual and collective liberty* as the only creator of order for mankind.

3. *Liberty* is the absolute right of all adult men and women to seek no sanction for their actions except their own conscience and their own reason, to determine them only of their own free will, and consequently to be responsible for them to themselves first of all, and then to the society of which they are a part, but only in so far as they freely consent to be a part of it.

4. It is quite untrue that the freedom of the individual is bounded by that of every other individual. Man is truly free only to the extent that his own freedom, freely acknowledged and reflected as in a mirror by the free conscience of all other men, finds in their freedom the confirmation of its infinite scope. Man is truly free only among other equally free men, and since he is free only in terms of mankind, the enslavement of any one man on earth, being an offense against the very principle of humanity, is a denial of the liberty of all.

5. Every man's *liberty* can be realized, therefore, only by the *equality* of all. The realization of liberty in legal and actual equality is *justice.*

6. There is only one dogma, one law, one moral basis for men, and *that is liberty.* To respect your neighbor's liberty *is duty;* to love, help and serve him, *virtue.*

7. *Absolute rejection of any principle of authority and of raison d'État.*[2] *Human society,* which was originally a natural fact, prior to liberty and the awakening of the human mind, and which later became a religious fact, organized on the principle of divine and human authority, must now be reconstituted on the basis of liberty, henceforward to be the sole determinant of its organization, both political and economic. *Order in society must be the outcome of the greatest possible development of all local, collective and individual liberties. . .*

. . . .

[1] French: reason for being.
[2] French: reason of State; a measure taken by a government for the continuance of the state.

9. *Political organization.* It is impossible to determine a concrete, universal and compulsory norm for the internal development and political organization of nations, since the existence of each is subordinate to a host of variable historical, geographical and economic factors which never permit of the establishment of an organizational model equally applicable and acceptable to all. Furthermore, any undertaking of this nature, being utterly devoid of practical utility, would militate against the richness and spontaneity of life, which delights in infinite diversity, and would in addition be contrary to the very principle of liberty. Nevertheless, there do exist *essential, absolute conditions* without which the practical realization and organization of liberty will always be impossible. These conditions are:

9(a). The radical abolition of all official religion and every privileged or state-protected, -financed or -maintained church. Absolute freedom of conscience and propaganda for all, each man having the unlimited option of building as many temples as he pleases to his gods, whatever their denomination, and of paying and maintaining the priests of his religion.

9(b). Seen as religious corporations, churches shall enjoy none of the political rights which will belong to productive associations, shall be unable to inherit or possess wealth in common, excepting their houses or establishments of prayer, and shall never be allowed to participate in the upbringing of children, since their sole aim in life is the systematic negation of morality and liberty, and the practice of sorcery for profit.

9(c). Abolition of monarchy, republic.

9(d). Abolition of class, rank, privilege and distinction in all its forms. Complete equality of political rights for all men and all women; universal suffrage.

9(e). Abolition, dissolution, and moral, political, legal, bureaucratic and social bankruptcy of the *custodial, transcendental,* centralist *state,* lackey and alter ego of the church, and as such the permanent source of poverty, degradation and subjugation among the people. As a natural consequence, *abolition of all state universities—public* education must be the exclusive prerogative of the free communes and associations; *abolition of state magistracy—all judges* to be elected by the people; *abolition* of the *criminal and civil codes currently in force in Europe—because* all of these, being equally inspired by the worship of God, state, family as a religious and political entity, and property, are contrary to human rights, and because *only by liberty* can the code of liberty be created. *Abolition* of *banks,* and *all other state credit institutions. Abolition* of *all central administration, bureaucracies, standing armies* and *state police.*

9(f). Immediate and direct election of all public officials, both civil and judicial, as well of all national, provincial and communal councilors or representatives, by popular vote, which is to say by the universal suffrage of all adult men and women.

9(g). Reorganization of each region, taking as its basis and starting point *the absolute freedom of individual, productive association and commune.*

9(h). Individual rights.

(i). The right of every man or woman to be completely supported, cared for, protected, brought up and educated from birth to coming of age in all public, primary, secondary, higher, industrial, artistic and scientific schools at the expense of society.

(ii). The equal right of each to be advised and assisted by the latter, as far as possible, at the outset of the career which each new adult will freely choose, after which the society which has declared him completely free will exercise no further supervision or authority over him, decline all responsibility toward him, and owe him nothing more than respect and if necessary protection for his liberty.

(iii). The liberty of every adult man and woman must be absolute and complete freedom to come and go, openly to profess any shade of opinion, to be idle or active, immoral or moral, in other words to dispose of his own person and his own belongings as he pleases and to be answerable to no one; freedom either to live honestly, by their own labor, or shamefully, by exploiting charity or individual trust, given that such charity and trust be voluntary and be proffered by adults only.

(iv). Unconditional freedom for every variety of propaganda, whether through conversation, the press or in public or private meetings, without any constraint but the natural corrective power of public opinion. Absolute liberty of associations, not excepting those whose aims may be or seem to be immoral, and even including those whose aim is the corruption and [destruction] of individual and public liberty. . . .

(ix). Absolute abolition of all cruel and degrading sentences, corporal punishment and the death penalty as sanctioned and enforced by the law. Abolition of all those indefinite or protracted punishments which leave no hope and no real possibility of rehabilitation, since crime ought to be considered as sickness, and punishment as cure rather than social retaliation.

(x). Any individual condemned by the laws of any society, commune, province or nation shall retain the right not to submit to the sentence imposed on him, by declaring that he no longer wishes to be part of that society. But in such a case the society in question shall have the concomitant right to expel him from its midst and to declare him outside its warrant and protection.

(xi). Having thus reverted to the natural law of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, at least inside the territory occupied by that society, the individual shall be liable to robbery, ill-treatment and even death without any cause for alarm. Any person will be able to dispose of him like a dangerous animal, although never to subject him or use him as a slave.

10. *Social organization.* Without political equality there is no true political liberty, but political equality will only become possible when there is *economic and social equality.*

10(a). Equality does not mean the leveling down of individual differences, nor intellectual, moral and physical uniformity among individuals. . . . Nor do economic and social equality mean the leveling down of individual fortunes, in so far as these are products of the ability, productive energy and thrift of an individual. . . .

10(c). Justice, as well as human dignity, demands that *each individual should be the child of his own achievements, and only those achievements.* We hotly reject the doctrine of hereditary sin, disgrace and responsibility. By the same token, we must reject the illusory heredity of virtue, honors and rights—and *of wealth also.* The heir to any kind of wealth is no longer the complete child of his own achievements, and in terms of initial circumstance he is privileged.

10(d). *Abolition of the right of inheritance.* As long as this right continues, hereditary differences of class, rank and wealth—in other words, social inequality and privilege—will survive in fact, if not in law. But it is an inescapable social law that *defacto* inequality always produces inequality of rights: social inequality necessarily becomes political. . . .

10(g). Once the inequality produced by the right of inheritance has been abolished, there will still remain (but to a far lesser degree) the inequality that arises from differences in individual ability, strength and productive capacity—a difference which, while never disappearing altogether, will be of diminishing importance under the influence of an egalitarian upbringing and social system, and which in addition will never weigh upon future generations once there is no more right of inheritance.

10(h). Labor is the sole producer of wealth. Everybody is free, of course, either to die of starvation or to dwell among the wild beasts of the desert or the forest, but anybody who wants to live within society should earn his living by his own work, or run the risk of being considered a parasite, an exploiter of the wealth (that is, the labor) of others, and a thief.

10(i). *Labor* is the fundamental basis of dignity and human rights, for it is only by means of his own free, intelligent work that man becomes a creator in his turn, wins from the surrounding world and his own animal nature his humanity and rights, and creates the world of civilization. . . .

10(l). *The land, with all its natural resources, belongs to all, but will be held only by those who work it.*

10(m). Woman, *differing from man* but *not inferior to him, intelligent, industrious and free like him, is declared his equal both in rights and in all political and social functions and duties.*

10(n). Abolition not of the natural but of the *legal* family, based on civil law and ownership. Religious and civil marriage are replaced by *free marriage.* Two *adult* individuals of opposite sex have the right to unite and separate in accordance with their desires and mutual interests and the promptings of their hearts, nor does society have any right either to prevent their union or to hold them to it against their will. . . .

10(o). From the moment of conception until her child is born, a woman is entitled to a social subvention paid not for her benefit but for her child's. Any mother wishing to feed and rear her children will also receive all the costs of their maintenance and care from society. . . .

10(q). Children belong neither to their parents nor to society but to themselves and their future liberty.... It is true that their parents are their natural protectors, but *the legal and ultimate protector is society,* which has the right and duty to tend them because its own future depends on the intellectual and moral guidance they receive. Society can only give liberty to adults provided it supervises the upbringing of minors.

10(r). *School must take the place of church,* with the immense difference that the religious education provided by the latter has no other purpose than to perpetuate the rule of human ignorance or so-called divine authority, whereas school upbringing and education will have no other purpose than the true emancipation of the children upon reaching the age of majority, and will consist of nothing less than their progressive initiation into liberty by the threefold development of their physical and mental powers and their will. Reason, truth, justice, human respect, awareness of personal dignity (inseparable from the human dignity of another), love of liberty for one's own sake and for others belief in work as the basis and condition of all rights; contempt for unreason, falsehood, injustice, cowardice, slavery and idleness—these must be the keystones of public education. . . .

10(s). As soon as he comes of age, the adolescent will be declared a free citizen and absolute master of his actions. In exchange for the care it has exercised during his infancy, society will ask for three things: that he remain free, that he *live by his own labor*, and that he *respect the liberty of others*. And because the crimes and vices by which present—day society is afflicted are the sole outcome of defective social organization, we may be sure that given a form of organization and upbringing based on reason, justice, liberty, human respect and complete equality, good will become the rule and evil a morbid exception, ever decreasing under the all-powerful influence of moralized public opinion.

10(t). The old, the disabled and the sick will be cared for and respected, enjoy all public and social rights, and be generously maintained at the common expense. . . .

III. REQUISITE QUALITIES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL FAMILY:

He must be an atheist. . . .

He must, like ourselves, be the adversary of the principle of authority. . . .

He must be a revolutionary. He must understand that such a complete and radical transformation of society, which must necessarily involve the downfall of all privilege, monopoly and constituted power, will naturally not occur by peaceful means. . . .

He must understand that the sole and final purpose of this revolution is the true political, economic and social emancipation of the people. . . .

He will therefore despise any secondary movement whose immediate, direct aim is other than the political and social emancipation of the working classes, in other words the people, and will see it either as a fatal error or a shabby trick. Hostile to all compromise and conciliation—henceforward impossible—and to any false coalition with those whose interests make them the natural enemies of the people, *he must see that the only salvation for his own country and for the entire world lies in social revolution.*

. . . . *He must understand that the social revolution will necessarily become a European and worldwide revolution.*

That the world will inevitably split into two camps, that of the new life and of the old privileges, and that between these two opposing camps, created as in the time of the wars of religion not by national sympathies but by community of ideas and interests, a war of extermination is bound to erupt, with no quarter and no respite. . . .

That this will not be a war of conquest, but of emancipation. . . .

That even in the most apparently hostile countries, once the social revolution breaks out at one point it will find keen and tenacious allies in the popular masses, who will be unable to do other than rally to its banner as soon as they understand and come in contact with its activities and purpose. That it will consequently be necessary to choose the most fertile soil for its beginning, where it has only to withstand the first assault of reaction before expanding to overwhelm the frenzies of its enemies, federalizing all the lands it has absorbed and welding them into a single indomitable revolutionary alliance.

Questions:

1. What is the problem with Western society in Bakunin's view?
2. According to Bakunin, why must all authority be destroyed?
3. How do you think Bakunin's philosophy may have influenced twentieth-century political and social ideologies?